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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court properly impute income to Mr. Colburn 
of $40,000 per year for purposes of computing alimony when there 
were no jobs available in the aviation insurance business, the 
highest job offer received outside his field of expertise was 
$23,000 per year and working as a certified financial planner 
represented the most lucrative long-term employment reasonably 
available? Reviewed to determine if abuse of discretion in 
applying appropriate legal standards. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 
1021 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Did the trial court properly award alimony to Mrs. Colburn 
of $1,000 per month for five years and $500 per month thereafter 
where Mrs. Colburn1s monthly income is $3,092.00 more than Mr. 
Colburn's actual monthly income and only $35.00 less than Mr. 
Colburn's monthly income using imputed earnings of $'i,333 per 
month? Reviewed to determine if abuse of discretion in applying 
appropriate standards. Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P. 2d 250, 251-52 
(Utah App. 1993); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App. 
1991). 
3. Did the trial court properly award Mrs. Colburn 34% of Mr. 
Colburn's Navy retirement benefits based on years of marriage 
rather than 19.5% based on the point system utilized by the Navy? 
Reviewed for correctness without any special deference. Bingham v. 
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Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994); Smith v. Smith, 793 
P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
None. 
STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5(7)(a)(b)(c) U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
(a) The court shall consider at least the following 
factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse; 
(ii) the recipients' earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the 
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, 
in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a) . 
However the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base 
alimony on the standard of living that existed at the 
time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no 
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, 
the court may consider the standard of living that 
existed at the time of the marriage. 
Section 78-45-7.5(7) U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the 
parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is 
held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall 
be based upon employment potential and probable earnings 
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
RULES 
None. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 12, 1994, Mary Elizabeth Colburn (hereinafter "Mrs. 
Colburn") filed an action in the District Court of Summit County, 
Utah, seeking a divorce from James Robert Colburn (hereinafter "Mr. 
Colburn"). 
On September 14, 1994, the case was tried without a jury 
before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki. 
On March 3, 1995, the court executed the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce after having resolved 
post-trial issues primarily relating to the language to be included 
in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The parties were married on September 1, 1973, in San 
Francisco, California. (R. 212, f 2 FOF) . 
2. The parties have two children born as issue of the 
marriage, Michelle Renee Colburn who was born March 19, 1977 and 
James Andrew Colburn who was born on April 12, 1983. (R. 212, 5 4 
FOF) . 
3. Mr. Colburn is a former aviation underwriter having worked 
for National Aviation Underwriters from 1971 through February, 1988 
and Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters from May, 1988 until 
July 1, 1992. (Tr. 77,83,85,90). 
4. Mr. Colburn lost his employment at both National Aviation 
Underwriters and Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters when 
both companies downsized as a result of the contracting aviation 
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underwriting business. (Tr. 83-84, 88; R. 212, 5 6 FOF)• 
5. Mr. Colburn's earned income for the six years prior to 
trial was as follows: 
1989 $117,980 
1990 $129,802 
1991 $140,585 
1992 $126,286 
1993 $ 0 
1994 $ 0 
(Defendant's Exhibit 27; R. 212, f 7 FOF). 
6. Mr. Colburn attempted to locate employment as an executive 
in the aviation insurance industry for approximately six months 
after losing his job at Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters 
in July, 1992. In this regard, he contacted headhunters but nobody 
wanted to pick up aviation executives because it was a dying 
industry; he contacted all of his previous contacts; and he 
contacted six or seven companies in the aviation industry and there 
was no employment options for senior aviation insurance 
underwriters. (Tr. 93,96,97; R. 212, f 8 FOF). 
7. Mr. Colburn considered going into other areas of insurance 
other than aviation. However, there were no jobs available in the 
Marine Division of Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters and 
New York Life started agents at $13,000 per year. The best offer 
Mr. Colburn received was selling financial products/insurance for 
IDS at $23,000 per year. (Tr. 90,98; R. 212, f 8 FOF). 
8. In 1986, Mr. Colburn started working toward obtaining a 
certified financial planner (CFP) designation as his second career 
because he foresaw huge cutbacks in the aviation insurance business 
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as a result of product liability suits, low premiums and 
substantial decreases in the production of new aircraft. (Tr. 79-
82; R. 213, J 9 FOF). 
9. In Junef 1993, the parties moved to Park City, Utah to 
pursue Mr. Colburnfs financial planning business. (Tr. 102). 
10. In August, 1993, Mr. Colburn started Summit Financial 
Advisors Group, Inc.. (Tr. 102). 
11. Mr. Colburn had no earnings in 1993 and the parties lived 
off their substantial savings. (Tr. 104; Defendant's Exhibit 27). 
12. At the time of trial, Mr. Colburn was earning $2 64.00 per 
month as a certified financial planner. (R. 211, f 5 FOF). 
13. At the time Mr. Colburn chose to become a certified 
financial planner the parties realized it would take four to five 
years to establish a secure and profitable business. (Tr. 105; R. 
213, 5 11 FOF). 
14. At the time of trial Mr. Colburn was fifty-one years of 
age. He is in good health, has a college education and job skills 
from employment in the insurance industry that can be transferred 
to different or other fields of employment. (Tr. 75; R. 213, f 10 
FOF) . 
15. The Court determined that Mr. Colburn was voluntarily 
underemployed as a certified financial planner and determined that 
he could earn a minimum salary of $40,000 per year should he choose 
to remedy his voluntary underemployment based on his work history, 
historical income, occupational gualif ications, prevailing earnings 
of people with similar backgrounds in the community and the 
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testimony of experts. (R. 213, f 12 FOF). 
16. At the time of trial, Mrs. Colburn was forty-two years of 
age. She is in good health, has a college education and secure 
employment as a registered nurse at a salary of $2,900.00 per 
month. (Tr. 35; R. 213, f 13 FOF). 
17. During the marriage the parties acquired Non-IRA assets 
totaling approximately $450,000 and IRA assets totalling 
approximately $608,000 which by stipulation of the parties was 
divided equally between them. (R. 214,219, J 15,35 FOF). 
18. The Court determined that a reasonble expected rate of 
return on the above referenced non-IRA funds is six percent per 
annum. Accordingly, each party was attributed $1,125.00 in 
interest on their non-IRA funds to be added to their incomes in 
calculating child support. (R. 214, I 16 FOF). 
19. Mr. Colburn is the owner of an additional ULTRA 
investment account which he acquired via an inheritance from his 
father. At the time of trial, the account was valued at 
$61,220.67. The imputed rate of return on that account at six 
percent per annum is $306.10 which amount is added to Mr. Colburn's 
income for purposes of calculating child support. (R. 214, f 17 
FOF) . 
20. Exclusive of alimony, Mrs. Colburn has income of 
$4,729.00 per month ($2,900 employment; $1,125 non-IRA earnings; 
$704 child support). (R. 213,214,215, f 13,16,18 FOF). 
21. Mrs. Colburn's monthly expenses total $3,906.30 which 
include $600 for entertainment, $350 for schooling, $1,500 rent and 
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$2 00 auto expense associated with the 1993 Subaru vehicle. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 7). 
22. Mr. Colburn has actual income of $1,695.00 per month 
($264 employment; $1,125 non-IRA earnings and $306 ULTRA earnings). 
(R. 211,214, f 5,16,17 FOF). 
23. Mr. Colburn's monthly expenses total $2,179.00 which 
include $400 for rent, $200 for entertainment and $150.00 for auto 
expenses associated with a 1982 Volvo. (Defendant's Exhibit 28 with 
adjustments set forth in Point II). 
24. Mrs. Colburn has a positive cash flow of $823.00 each 
month without receiving the $1,000.00 per month alimony awarded by 
the Court. (R. 213,214,215, J 13,16,18 FOF; Plaintiff's Exhibit 
7). 
25. Mr. Colburn has a negative cash flow of $484.00 each 
month without paying the $1,000 per month alimony award ordered by 
the Court. (R. 211,214, f 5,16,17 FOF; Defendant's Exhibit 28). 
26. When alimony is factored into the calculations, Mrs. 
Colburn's positive cash flow for the first five years after divorce 
increases to $1,823.00 each month and Mr. Colburn's negative cash 
flow will increase to $1,484.00 per month. (R. 211,213,214,215,216, 
f 5,13,16,17,18,22 FOF). 
27. Mr. Colburn was on active duty with the United States 
Navy during the years 1965 through 1969 and on inactive duty 
thereafter until March 31, 1987. (Defendant's Exhibit 20). 
28. Mr. Colburn has retirement benefits from his service in 
the United States Navy which utilizes a point system to determine 
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retirement benefits. Mr. Colburn earned 1,470.00 of his total 
retirement points of 2,409 prior to his marriage to Mrs. Colburn. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 2 0). 
29. The Court granted Mrs. Colburn 34% of Mr. Colburn1s Navy 
retirement based on the years of marriage rather than 19.49% which 
reflects the point system calculated by the Navy for awarding 
retirement benefits. (Defendant's Exhibit 20; R. 217, 5 29 FOF). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court improperly imputed income to Mrs. Colburn. 
The statute, 78-45-7.5(7)(a) U.C.A. 1953, as amended, specifically 
requires as a threshold matter that there be a determination of 
voluntary unemployment or underemployment before the Court can 
impute income. Mr. Colburn's diminished income level did not 
result from personal preference or voluntary decision, but rather 
from events beyond his control in the aviation underwriting 
industry. Despite his diligent efforts, the highest job offer Mr. 
Colburn was able to secure was $23,000 per year selling financial 
products/insurance for IDS. Accordingly, the decision to start a 
financial planning business in Park City, Utah using Mr. Colburn's 
CFP training and contacts was a prudent business decision and does 
not constitute voluntary underemployment. 
II. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony 
to Mrs. Colburn where her monthly income is $3,092.00 more than Mr. 
Colburn's actual monthly income and only $35.00 less than Mr. 
Colburn's monthly income using imputed earnings for Mr. Colburn of 
$3,333 per month. This abuse of discretion is further evidenced by 
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the fact Mrs. Colburn has a positive monthly cash flow of $823.00 
and Mr. Colburn has a negative monthly cash flow of $484.00 without 
an alimony award. When alimony is factored into the calculations, 
Mrs. Colburn's positive monthly cash flow increases to $1,823.00 
each month and Mr. Colburn's negative cash flow increases to 
$1,484.00 per month. 
III. The trial court improperly awarded Mrs. Colburn 34% of 
Mr. Colburn's Navy retirement benefits based on years of marriage 
rather than the point system utilized by the United States Navy. 
Mr. Colburn accrued approximately 62% of his retirement benefits 
prior to marriage and Mrs. Colburn is only entitled to 50% of the 
retirement benefits actually earned during the marriage. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY IMPUTED INCOME TO MR. COLBURN 
OF $40,000.00 PER YEAR FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMPUTING 
ALIMONY INASMUCH AS THERE WERE NO JOBS AVAILABLE IN THE 
AVIATION INSURANCE BUSINESS, THE HIGHEST JOB OFFER RECEIVED 
OUTSIDE OF THE AVIATION INSURANCE INDUSTRY WAS $23,000 PER 
YEAR AND WORKING AS A CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER 
REPRESENTED THE MOST LUCRATIVE EMPLOYMENT REASONABLY AVAILABLE. 
Utah law requires that before a court may impute income there 
must be a finding of voluntary unemployment or underemployment. 
Section 78-45-7.5(7)(a) provides: 
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent 
stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and 
a finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed 
or underemployed. 
While the foregoing statute refers to a "parent", the above 
statute has been used in numerous cases as it pertains to 
imputation of income for the purposes of both child support and 
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- • '^" ; <"«=> Hall v.. Hall, supra, Bell v. Bell, supra, and 
Willev •« Willev 
The issue c: voluntary underemployment has been addressed by 
the appellate courts * ne State f t r;ta.i -umerous occasions. 
•I I'' H a i l V, H d l l , - iU j J i a , 
consultant and software developer and i:aa itniiiq.- excess .1 
$100,000 rnr "o^ >- * -.*•- ^ P yp^c •-^ ft '98l- <ui3 ;i9i . Approximately 
ten days 
salary of $40, y' ,ei 'edi\ *v- husband ^4,ufu --nat 
diminished income levo ! -^ii !-^ *irr ? r ?r.; :- is personal oreference 
or voluntary decision, 
lucrative consulting contracts and the $40,. . ^  per _^d: JOJJ Wdb 
the : i : .] j r amp] oyment availab * ^  The trial ^irt based its chi Id 
support and alimony m " 
rather than his income .-it : no t ;me i-i *: ; • The husband appealed 
^ voluntas ' T irn--a»-omployed as required 
k. y Liio dLuve qUOtec* ^lat i i t fc l - -
trial courl'•. decision that the husband was underemployed 
u une court. Ii i addressing the 
underemploymen t ISLL. , . _e nonr* ii^. 
finding that appellarr , i. roluntarily underemployed 
cannot properly be implied in this case. Although the 
trial court found that appellant is currently earning 
less than he was previously, that isolated findings does 
not answer the critical question of whether the drop in 
earnings was voluntary. Rather, appellant's current 
1Mr. Colburn is not appealing the trial court's child support 
award even though it is based on imputed income. This appeal 
relates solely to imputing income for purposes of calculating t ho 
alimony award 
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earnings, as compared to his historical income, is merely 
one element in the matrix of factual issues affecting the 
ultimate finding of whether appellant is underemployed. 
Many critical questions are left unanswered: What are 
appellant's abilities? Is appellant's current salary 
below the prevailing market for a person with his 
abilities? Are there any job openings for a person with 
appellant's abilities? At a minimum, the trial court must 
determine appellant's employment capacity and earnings 
potential - which it failed to do even in its 
determination of the amount to impute under section 
(7)(b)- before it could logically conclude that he is, in 
fact, underemployed. Inasmuch as there are no subsidiary 
findings showing that the trial court actually found that 
a person with appellant's abilities could be earning more 
in the relevant market, we cannot imply a finding that 
appellant is underemployed. We accordingly reverse the 
trial court's determination that appellant is 
underemployed and remand for evaluation of that issue and 
the entry of appropriate findings. 858 P.2d at 102 6 
In Bell v. Bell, supra, the trial court imputed a $1,500 
income to Mrs. Bell despite undisputed testimony that she earned 
$863 per month as a part-time teaching assistant at Utah State 
University. The imputed income was based on the level she had 
previously earned as a full-time school teacher in another state 
approximately two years before she filed for divorce. The court 
noted that no explanation was offered for this unusual income 
adjustment and remanded the case back to the trial court for 
additional findings on the alimony issue. 
Similarly, in Willey v. Willey, supra, the trial court first 
imputed income to the wife based on full-time employment at her 
current wage of $860.00 per month and then, without any factual 
basis, speculated that she could raise her income to $1,500 to 
$2,000 per month. In holding the imputation of income was an abuse 
of discretion, the court stated: 
We do not question the trial court's authority to impute 
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i i icome to Mrs. Willey. Imputing income to an unemployed 
or underemployed spouse when setting an alimony award is 
conceptually appropriate as part of the determination of 
that spouse's ability to produce a sufficient income. 
However, i t cannot be premised upon mere conjecture; 
instead, it demands a careful -^ * "^ecise assessment 
requiring detailed findings.. 
lit 1 the case a t I : a:i : , I::l 1 = 3 : = :! s c J: i :ii i i si iff j : i ei it I :)as:i = , f :: :II : I::l: I = 
court to determine that Mr. Coiburn is voluntarily underemployed. 
"The rvi 'iri4-^ ^  insurance business has ^r-^n . ^ rntract: nq industry ror 
years. Debbie :<_ , 
exclusive aviation .rsurance underwriting business :n tne State oi 
i -ne w a s forced due "^ -u.c- nature ^r ^~KP business ro 
Lire <iil u u employees and opt .L*^  
(Tr. 66,67) With regard to the .:tate . t * 'i^  aviation insurance 
"i 7a 1 :i ne testified: 
: Since 1971 when you first started, have you 3e< = mi: I i J: : .} 
changes in the aviation underwriting business? 
hat are the major changes that you have seen? 
iecreased respect? 
Premiums have dropped, and there isr 4 as much aviation 
business ~"*- there. ?A really a depressed market. 
10 .*» premiums stare *, drop? 
^ io uiey took a 60 percent drop in 
ne vrear 
going down steady_v uvei a^ce. 
MUUU about the number of companies? wh«:>: is your awareness of 
the number of companies involve -i \r aviation underwriting? 
A: The companies have decreased also. 
Q: And do you have an opinion as to what has caused that? 
A: A lot of it is they haven't made any airplanes for about 15 to 
18 years now, and so there isn't any new business coming into 
the market when all we are doing is taking business away from 
each other. (Tr. 64,65) 
Mrs. Valline further testified that she could not hire Mr. 
Colburn even with his experience. Further, if she was able to hire 
Mr. Colburn it would be based primarily on a commission inadequate 
for Mr. Colburn to support his family. (Tr. 67,68) 
Mr. Colburn also testified to the depressed state of the 
aviation insurance industry. Using the records put out by the 
General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Mr. Colburn testified 
that the production of planes have dropped from a high of 17,811 
new aircraft in 1978 to a low of 941 in 1992. (Defendant's Exhibit 
9) He also testified when he started in the aviation insurance 
business in 1971 there were 42 or 43 companies. In 1986 the number 
of companies had been reduced to 15. (Tr. 79) The reason 
attributed by Mr. Colburn for this dramatic decrease was products 
insurance unlimited liability by the manufacturers resulving in no 
new aircraft being produced thereby causing reduction of insurance 
premiums. (Tr. 81) 
When Mr. Colburn was asked to resign from Southern Marine and 
Aviation there were simply no other jobs available anywhere in the 
aviation insurance business. Mr. Colburn's letter of resignation 
was forced upon him in order for him to get a positive 
recommendation for future employment and receive insurance and 
severance pay for four months. Mr. Colburn testified that he 
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attempted to secure work, ^or c: i v months >: .side and outside of 
t h e JviaL.if'11 
available, Mr. Colburn moved . r.: * ** . . ami! . to st^rt 
a financial c l a ^ ^ a business* 
The triai 
Colburn a:~ : ~ i\ :ontracting -.viation maerwii: ^iu 
industr" • r4rxw«^ p*-. -h^ ^urr .ii^ n found that 
Mr. (. . .,^ ,,„;. ... . 
executive? in 'he insurance industry t: i in officer nited 
S^t : *T • -< J acquired. TU"J 1 i f i car i rn ?>illc" t_^ >*•* ^ ransferr^ *• ^  
different ., other fields .. . ,: i. 
only testimony presented :;* This regard was rne Testimony ot Connie 
p »> • " : tation'r"-: - -~~r** ^ociilist ^^ "lK^ ^ r o o r 
Guidance Center. ,; ~o, admitted . . .. _ .:I:LJ 
deals with dislocated, disabled individuals, minorities and youth. 
represented anyone m Uit ^i.ation ... . \ . ng business 
pilots, "v i *>; r experience with executives 1 che 
i • • rnecticut 
Mutual. (Tr. .^J; She iaitiiti adir«j,u.. tn^t ^ne naa never 
represented .\ ertified financial planner. rr. 125) 
T ' ! ifications of Ms. 
Romboy as evidenced by the following statement: 
• THE COURT: Okay. Let me stop \ o , ? >>e, M 
Objection is sustained as to her opinion 
basis of his employment that being as a-. 
both specifically as National Aviation Underwriter and 
Southern Maine Underwriters. Voir dire indicates that 
she does not have the — i n my opinion the necessary 
contact and/or experience as to those particular areas in 
which to opine what available employment would be — 
alternative available would be for the defendant in this 
matter. 
However, I will let you pursue the aspect of a CFP. I 
believe that foundation has been established for her to 
opine as to her, number one, alternative employment 
opportunities and she has indicated a familiarity and 
studies in the area of CFPs and stocks. I will allow you 
to pursue that. (Tr. 126, 127) 
After objection by Mr. Colburn's attorney regarding the issue 
of the transferability of skills, the court further stated: 
THE COURT: Well, she cannot testify as to any insurance 
because she has no background there as to general 
aviation. I have allowed her to talk in terms of 
transferability as to — and the relationship as to 
certified financial planners. 
Let me ask Ms. Romboy, how many different categories did 
you examine for specific transferability? 
THE WITNESS: Excuse me for that pause there. Basically 
I took a look at two of them. 
THE COURT: Two of them? Which two were they? 
THE WITNESS: They are a marketing and public relations 
manager and also management consultant. 
THE COURT: And as to those areas I will allow her to give the 
low and high range. (Tr. 142) 
Connie Romboy then testified that the public relations manager 
should earn between $36,000 and $52,000 per year and that while 
there is no high range for management consultants fifty percent of 
management consultants earn from $24,900 to $51,000 per year. (Tr. 
142,143) 
It is difficult to imagine that Mr. Colburn who spent twenty 
years in the aviation underwriting business could qualify for a job 
as a public relations manager or management consultant. On cross 
15 
-r - conceded +"he following; lust because there 
are people , .re ..aKir/j 
does not necessarily mean there is a :,ob -venuvA *•. -1^1. salary 
(• ' n--? -r^ educed '^- -npr^vimately five percent 
( T r . - « l a o i : . , ... -
consider lor * re* short torn but the onq :erm iTr. 134; ; 
iurrvv -"^^ ^ • « 'uncial planner takes 
-.M ^  develop the ~ypt 
average salary 1 )4 •; ; per-on is i: L • inderemployed" because 
tlif,iv Jci-iJn L"j " i school teacher instead of ^  financial 
planner even though thei. :a< onic - L ^u^:a.. 
If Mr. Colburn was her client
 :nd unable to locate employment as an 
a . . ^xecut'' ~ T wouii ^onrider 
financial planning i-» i-c- : ^. , i ,, .*,*... .. , pursur 
Assuming for the purpose argument tha curt 
dett * T ! - - * ~~e *^  > 
basis re :n- *ridi u>ia( i..., ' a;. :. Colbur .:icome be 
imputed at $40,000 P P ^ ('^n' Che statute re > it nq * the amount of 
imp i. 
If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be 
based upon employment potential and probable earnings as 
derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and 
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in 
the community. 
As set forth in the testimony of Debbie Valline, Connie Romboy 
and James Colburn, there irht either locally or 
national 1 1 5 I t :: ill > :>y 
testified that Mr. Colburn has job SKI 1 tb diM education which could 
be transferred to other employment such as a co-pilot (average 
salary $28,000-30,000) marketing public relations (average salary 
$36,000-$52,000), or management consultant (average salary $24,900-
$51,000)• However, there was no evidence that jobs were available 
in these areas especially for Mr. Colburn who is fifty-one years of 
age and without experience in these fields. In fact, Mr. Colburn 
specifically testified that he sought employment in non-aviation 
insurance fields and received only two job offers at $13,000 and 
$23,000 per year. Mr. Colburn testified he could earn $10.00 per 
hour working for another financial planner and Connie Romboy 
testified that a beginning financial planning consultant would earn 
$28,000 per year nationally or $26,600 in the State of Utah. (Tr. 
128, 156) Accordingly, if there is a basis to impute income in 
this case it should only be at a maximum of $26,600 per year. 
However, there is no evidence that such jobs are available and Mr. 
Colburn has a better future owning and operating his own financial 
planning business. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED 
ALIMONY TO MRS. COLBURN WHETHER OR 
NOT INCOME IS IMPUTED TO MR. COLBURN. 
In Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the well-settled standard for alimony in 
Utah. The Court stated: 
The most important function of alimony is to provide 
support for the [spouse] as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she [or he] enjoyed during the 
marriage, and to prevent the [spouse] from becoming a 
public charge. English v. English, 565 P.2d [409] at 411 
(Utah 1977)... Three factors... must be considered in 
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fixing a reasonable ali mony award: 
[1] the financial condit. - * the 
[spouse seeking support]; 
[2] the ability of the
 L~pc ^ -ec-^ng 
support] to produce a sufficient income for 
[himself or] herself; and 
£ 3 J the ability of the [payor spouse] 
provide support. 
Tlnr' 1017m i ntandarH. has been reiterated bv 'curts a regul ax 
basi- ... iadressi ** ->. ^j^±.± „_i_* ----- - - ^ -, Thronson 
v, Thronson, 810 P.2d 4^8. ^;l M'tah App. :9- ), willey v. Willey, 
supra, Hi 1 1 v • _ 16a ° M ^^  . TM .m . _, xnct 3chaumberq 
v. Schaumberg, 1 
After the tria . w * rr-s , rhe irrj Legislature codified +-be 
insider makinc - => 1 i ?.on\ dpfprminatio- Section 
\*, Trie ourt shall consider at least the following 
factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse; 
(ii) the recipients „i __ 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability n the payor ;. ouse r. ; roviae support; m d 
(iv) the 1 ength o t * : i o rri 1 r r : 
In considering t cr.tei n jet forth above, there ire 
c o m p e l I mi 111 mi m a s o n s In alimony should •* *• v^ - - ^ p p awarded. Mrs. 
Colburn is a registered nurse ^ . 
cf trial. Exclusive 01 iiimony, Mrs. Colburn has income a ?<+, 
. 1 in n I mi in mi h i 1 ,; ' ovmentr ^n-TP71 ^arninn<=* <:'t 4 *n * <; 
support) , >n monthly e x p e n s e -
D e c l a r a t i o n da ted August t . . 4 - Produced . -
I ' l a i 11 J ^ iiei monthly e x p e n s e s «L. 
18 
$3f906.30. 
In contrast, Mr. Colburn has actual earnings of $1,695.00 per 
month ($264 employment; $1,125 non-IRA earnings and $306 ULTRA 
earnings). Mr. Colburn's monthly expenses as set forth in his 
Financial Declaration dated August 19, 1994 which was introduced as 
Defendant's Exhibit 28 at trial total $2,802.00. However, by 
adding an additional $177.00 per month in child support to arrive 
at the court ordered total of $704.00 and reducing expenses by $800 
for costs associated with Summit Financial Advisors Group, Mr. 
Colburn's total monthly expenses total $2,179 without an alimony 
payment. These monthly expenses include: $400 for rent, as 
opposed to Mrs. Colburn's $1,500 rental obligation; $2 00 for 
entertainment compared to Mrs. Colburn's $600 per month 
entertainment allowance; and $150.00 for auto expenses associated 
with a 1982 Volvo which is $50 less than Mrs. Colburn's auto 
expense for her 1993 Subaru. 
Based on the foregoing income and expense calculations, Mrs. 
Colburn has a positive cash flow of $823.00 and Mr. Colburn has a 
negative cash flow of $484.00 without taking into consideration the 
alimony ordered by the court. When alimony is factored into the 
calculations, Mrs. Colburn's positive monthly cash flow increases 
to $1,823.00 each month and Mr. Colburn's negative cash flow 
increases to $1,484.00 per month. Even with the court imputed 
income to Mr. Colburn of $40,000 per year or $3,333 per month, Mrs. 
Colburn's actual monthly income is only $35 less than Mr. Colburn's 
monthly income. 
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Twr» disparity '•  "he respective financial conditions of the 
parties . . ieratior 
set forth "h*j affidavit. * : nines KuDei I • ^ J I ; . , .,e is suDjeji 
«~ r-,ri*= employment, federal, state, SUTA una TA raxes which total 
$80,311.58 per year -ist r..: rti«-<M ..-» financier ^
 LJ^ ,,'.,.,,. *.,. ^ 
per month -*v* c-ic * 1Q per year ^^n,3n,58 Gross Earnings less taxes 
(i. i ' 
The parties accumulated significant assets dur./.c h<=> 
marriage. As ^P*- forth -« Affidavit oi James Robert Colburn, 
dated 
accounts with each party receiving $21 . * . n -u.i . . _ ^ , ^ 
the *'** « - w .<-. »^ >.. ii video with *- u-n party receivma 
outside or net monthly income she *M. substantial assets 
'T^-^ih'" ^xrr" ' ( manifestly unfair for 
cour; ^ eguire 
pay Mrs. Colburn alimony when she earns $v >f> ' « n more 'iidh ,-n . 
Colburn t» monthl ncome using 
month. 
stablished i • 7 - ^  * ^  ^  i^ i -ony awards shou ; -= 
the extent possible equalize , «cl < 
living and maintain them M ^vei as t*los< as possible to U M I 
r-t-^ nrl in I * the marri"*"0 'el J v. Howell, 
806 P.2d 
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1081 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones, supra; Hialev v. Hialev. 676 P.2d 
379, 381 (Utah 1983). 
In Howell, supra, the husband was a pilot for Delta Airlines. 
At the time of divorce he had a gross monthly income of $10,120 and 
monthly expenses of $7,960. The wife was a homemaker who had 
worked only part time at unskilled labor jobs. At the time of 
trial, the wife had a temporary job where she earned $649.80 per 
month and her expenses totaled $5,021. The wife appealed the 
alimony award on the basis that the court did not properly consider 
all relevant factors resulting in an unjustifiable low alimony 
award. After citing the three factors outlined above the court 
quoted Gardner v. Gardner, supra, for the proposition that the 
alimony award in a long-term marriage should "to the extent 
possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possible to that standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage". 806 P.2d at 1212. The Court 
after analyzing the alimony and child support award determined that 
when the child support obligation ceases approximately fifteen 
months after the divorce decree, the husband will have a gross 
monthly income of $8,200 in comparison to defendant's gross monthly 
income of $2,445. The court concluded: 
The alimony set by the court does not come close to 
equalizing the parties' standard of living as of the time 
of the divorce, but allows plaintiff a two to four times 
advantage. We, therefore, hold that the alimony amount 
set by the court was clearly erroneous. 806 P. 2d at 1213 
In a footnote to the above language, the court stated: 
Exact mathematical equality of income is not required, 
but sufficient parity to allow both parties to be on 
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equal footing financial]*/ -±x of the time of the divorce 
is required. 3o c ?..:d at :2I3. 
Tn Judge Ben^r ' 'oncurr.^na opinion I n Howell, he amplified 
the toi eqbinq ui - - •-
reduce the standard : ivini he paying spouse below that 
I !"in e re ce i v i n q spou se ; 
The alimony award, however, need not be 
maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage if that amount of alimony 
would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse 
below that of the receiving spouse. Alimony may only 
raise the standard of living of the receiving spouse 
until it is roughly equal to that of the paying spouse. 
It is in this sense that alimony should seek "to the 
extent possible, [to] equalize the parties1 respective 
post-divorce living standards." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 
P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (Emphasis added) 806 
P.2d at 1216. . . 
Tl I = : .• :: • ii: !:: addressed the issue of alimony on paqe 9 and I <i I 
its nil ing, a copy of 'which i s attached hereto as Addendum I Il II 
reviewing this ruling, it appears that the court based its alimony 
a i } a r • I • :: l it tl: l s f ::  Oil ] :: • ; i :ii it l g t l I I e • =i f a c t i UTI : ( I ) I Ii w i "o 1 b u r n , ir;; l a c k of 
a marital residence; (2) Mrs. Colburn's pursuit ol a PHD degree; 
and, length of the marriage. 
court- failure ; ,; euuc-;w.cr i^.c- ^ d i i ^ . . ^ectx.'c Jtai.udru 
living. M r s . colburn's lack of -<ai re. .dence should nor t>e 
-^sidenc- at. trie 
time of the divorce. The real properties owned by tl: le parties were 
sold during the marriage and - :••. --.M- x:eeds -onstitut-
abilir. *rr- . iquidate theit -. KM poitioi 
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portion of the proceeds to purchase a marital residence. Further, 
pursuant to the Financial Declarations submitted by both parties, 
Mrs. Colburn has a $1,500 per month rental expense whereas Mr. 
Colburn's rental expense is only $400. With only a small down 
payment and a monthly mortgage payment of $1,500 per month, Mrs. 
Colburn could purchase a comfortable marital residence. In 
contrast, Mr. Colburn would have to increase his housing expense by 
$1,100 per month to obtain equivalent housing to that of Mrs. 
Colburn. 
Mrs. Colburn1 s pursuit of a PHD degree does not justify an 
alimony award in this action. Mrs. Colburn has a college education 
and is employed in her occupation of choice with a salary of 
approximately $35,000 per year. Assuming Mrs. Colburn pursues a 
PHD degree, the evidence presented at court is that it would be 
completed on a part-time basis so that her salary would continue. 
(Tr. 43) The court awarded Mrs. Colburn alimony of $1,000 per 
month rather than $500 per month for the first five years so that 
Plaintiff can obtain her PHD degree. This results in alimony of 
$60,000 over the first five years after the divorce without any 
evidence that Plaintiff's income would increase with a PHD degree. 
Mrs. Colburn testified that her $350.00 per month expense for 
"school, kids and graduate school" is for "her graduate school, the 
children's school supplies, books and miscellaneous". (Tr. 42). As 
set forth in the income and expense figures set forth above, Mrs. 
Colburn is in a position to cover her graduate school expenses 
should she desire to pursue the same without alimony payments. 
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There is no basis for the court to award an extra $500.00 per month 
alimony for schooling where the evidence presented is that $350.00 
per month covers not only Mrs. Colburn's graduate school but the 
children's school supplies, books, etc.. 
It is submitted that length of marriage has no bearing on 
alimony in this case. While the parties were involved in a twenty-
two year marriage, Mr. Colburn had only been employed at his 
current occupation for approximately one year as of the date of 
trial. Mrs. Colburn is ten years younger than Mr. Colburn and she 
should be able to generate earnings for ten years longer than Mr. 
Colburn. A long term marriage does not mean alimony should be 
paid. It only means that if alimony is justified, it should 
continue for a longer period. 
The alimony award in the case at bar does not equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. On the contrary, it 
increases Mr. Colburn's negative cash flow from $484 to $1,484 per 
month and increases Mrs. Colburn's positive cash flow from $823 per 
month to $1,823 per month. A discrepancy of $3,3 07 per month or 
$39,684 per year without even taking into consideration the tax 
consequence is clearly unwarranted. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED MRS. COLBURN NAVY 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS BASED ON YEARS OF MARRIAGE 
RATHER THAN THE POINT SYSTEM UTILIZED BY THE NAVY. 
Mr. Colburn served in the United States Navy from December 10, 
1965 through March 31, 1987. He was on active duty during the 
first four years and in the Naval reserves thereafter. The United 
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States Navy utilizes the point system to determine the amount of 
retirement benefits. At the time of marriage, Mr. Colburn had 
acquired 1,470 or 61% of 2,409 retirement points accumulated at the 
time of retirement. The trial court awarded Mrs. Colburn 3 4% of 
Mr. Colburn1s navy retirement based on the fact the parties were 
married during 68% of the years Mr. Colburn was acquiring 
retirement benefits. In so ruling, the court failed to take into 
consideration that Mr. Colburn was in active duty with the Navy 
prior to the marriage when the majority of the points were acquired 
and was on inactive status only during the marriage. 
Mr. Colburn is not asserting that his wife is not entitled to 
a share in his military retirement. Utah Courts have clearly 
established that retirement benefits are to be divided between the 
parties in a divorce action. Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (Utah 
App. 1988) Motes v. Motes, 786 P. 2d 232 (Utah App. 1989) and 
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (1990). Mr. Colburn is appealing 
the trial court's decision to allocate the Navy retirement based on 
years of marriage rather than the point system utilized by the 
United States Navy. 
While there are no Utah cases on this issue, In Re Marriage of 
Poppe, 97 Cal.App.3d 1, 158 Cal.Rptr. 500 (1979) is directly on 
point. In Poppe, the husband retired from the Navy with a total of 
5,002 points of which only 1,632 were earned during the marriage. 
The majority of the points were earned while the husband was on 
active duty prior to the marriage. The husband contended that the 
trial court should impute the wife's interest in the pension by 
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multiplying one-half times the fraction 1632/5002 times the amount 
of the pension to arrive at her retirement benefit. However, the 
trial court determined that the husbandfs "qualifying" years 
totaled 31.50 and apportioned the pension on the basis of the "time 
rule" by dividing the 27.25 years between marriage and separation 
by the 31.5 "qualifying" years to arrive at the wife's benefit. 
The Court ruled that "apportionment on the basis of the time rule 
is appropriate only where the amount of the retirement benefits is 
substantially related to the number of years of service". The 
Court then indicated that the husband's pension is not 
substantially related to the number of years he served in the Naval 
Reserve. The Court stated: 
...the amount of the pension is not a function of the 
number of years of service; the number of years of 
service during the marriage is not a fair gauge of the 
community contribution; and the court's apportionment of 
the pension on the basis of the number of "qualifying" 
years served as compared to the number of years of 
service during the marriage must be said to be 
unreasonable, arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. 158 
Cal.Rptr. at 504. 
Although it is fairly obvious that apportionment on the 
basis of points as urged by former husband would be 
appropriate, we would usurp the function of the trial 
court by modifying the judgment to apportion the 
retirement benefits on that basis. 158 Cal.Rptr. at 505. 
(A copy of In Re Marriage of Poppe, supra, is included as part 
of the Appendix herein inasmuch as it is part of the California 
Reporter system which may not be readily available to the court.) 
Similarly, In re Marriage of Davis, 113 Cal.App.3d 485, 169 
Cal.Rptr. 863 (1980), the court scrutinized a military pension and 
concluding that the final ten years of the employee-spouse's 
26 
service contributed nothing to the retirement benefits since this 
period of service consisted of reserve duty rather than active 
duty. The court found that though the full thirty-year period was 
required in order to receive benefits, the final ten years were 
"merely a condition precedent .... The right to retired pay is 
earned solely by service on active duty." (Id. at p. 489, 169 
Cal.Rptr. 863.) 
In the case at bar, the trial court utilized years of marriage 
as a basis to divide the Navy retirement relying on Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). In Woodward. the husband 
argued that his wife should not share in his military retirement on 
the basis it was not a marital asset inasmuch as he had only worked 
fifteen years at Hill Air Force Base and he would need to work 
thirty years to receive maximum benefits under the retirement plan. 
The court in addressing the vesting issue stated: 
....Whether that resource is subject to distribution does 
not turn on whether the spouse can presently use or 
control it, or on whether the resource can be given a 
present dollar value. The essential criterion is whether 
a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or 
in part during the marriage. To the extent that the 
right has so accrued it is subject to equitable 
distribution. 
In the instant case, the husband must work for another 
.- fifteen years to qualify for the maximum benefits under 
the pension plan. He will not qualify in the twenty-
ninth year or in the next to the last month. Because he 
must work a total of thirty years, his pension benefits, 
including any contribution by the government, are as 
dependent on the first fifteen years as the last fifteen. 
Thus, the wife is entitled to share in that portion of 
the benefits to which the rights accrued during the 
marriage. We hold that the trial court did not err in 
making equitable distribution of the husband's retirement 
benefits. 656 P.2d at 432, 433 
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As set forth above, the non-working spouse is entitled to only 
share in "that portion of the benefits to which the rights accrued 
during the marriage". This principle was addressed in Dunn v. 
Dunn, 802 P. 2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990) in the context of the 
husband's claim for projected earnings of $90,908 on the $43,173 
portion of retirement benefits which accumulated prior to marriage. 
The Court held that Mr. Dunn should be credited with all premarital 
contributions as well as interest thereon. This decision was based 
on the "general rule...that equity requires that each party retain 
the separate property he or she brought into the marriage, 
including any appreciation of the separate property." 802 P.2d at 
1320 
The trial court's decision to award the navy retirement on the 
basis of years of marriage did not take into consideration that 
over 60% of the retirement benefits accrued prior to marriage when 
Mr. Colburn was on active duty. Accordingly, the decision of the 
trial court should be reversed and Mrs. Colburn awarded retirement 
benefits computed by multiplying one-half times the fraction 
939/2409 times the amount of the pension or 19.5% of Mr. Colburn's 
Navy retirement. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should vacate the alimony award on the basis that 
it was improper to impute income Mr. Colburn or, alternatively, 
that no alimony should be awarded where Mr. Colburn's imputed 
monthly income is only $35 more than Mrs. Colburn's actual monthly 
income. Further, this court should award Mrs. Colburn 19.5% of Mr. 
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Colburn's United States Navy retirement benefit based on the navy 
point system rather than the years of marriage which does not 
accurately reflect the retirement rights accrued prior to marriage. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this & tU day of October, 1995. 
Christiansen 
& CHRISTIANSEN, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant, were mailed, postage prepaid, to John 
B. Anderson, Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent, 623 East First 
South, P.O. Box 11643, Salt Lake^pity, Utah ^ 8^147-0643, on this 
fopL day of October, 1995, 
Terry L). Christiansen 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
MARY ELIZABETH COLBURN, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JAMES ROBERT COLBURN, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 944300069 DA 
Ate. . 
F
'LEb 
• * * * * s& 26 i 1994 
*> a 9 r * o f s ^>co, 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLENN K. IWASAKI 5, 
REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
(Bench ruling) 
COALVILLE, UTAH 
September 13, 1994 
'Uflfy 
-O^L-
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 
ooanni 
1 A P P E A R A N C E S 
2 FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
3 JOHN B. ANDERSON 
4 ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
5 623 East 100 South 
6 Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
7 FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
8 TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN 
9 ATKINS & CHRISTIANSEN 
10 P. 0. Box 680284 
11 Park City, UT 84068 
12 COALVILLE, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 13, 1994; A.M. SESSION 
13 THE COURT: The record will show that we are back 
14 in session. I'm Ready to render a decision in this 
15 matter. 
16 To begin with jurisdiction and grounds have been 
17 established in this matter and plaintiff is to receive a 
18 decree of divorce in this matter. Custody to plaintiff, 
19 reasonable visitation to defendant with a minimum of 
2.0 statutory schedule. I encourage that there be very 
21 extreme liberal visitation in addition to the statutory. 
22 I think the children have benefited from both parents and 
23 that will continue to be. 
24 Some observations Ifd like to make at this time. 
25 There is no doubt that Mr. Colburn has been a very good 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 
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1 provider for the children and the family. There is no 
2 doubt that he has planned successfully, financially, in 
3 this matter. That he has set apart for college, to a 
4 large extent, which will cover most of the college 
5 expenses in this matter. But that still doesn't mean that 
6 because of his past good planning and good deeds that any 
7 future award should be mitigated because of the past. I 
8 just mention that to recognize that Mr. Colburn has done a 
9 very good job in providing. I am impressed with the 
10 amount of assets that have been amassed in this matter. 
11 Let's get to the biggest issue, is voluntary 
12 unemployment or under employment. Obviously he is not 
13 unemployed when he is voluntarily under employed. I have 
14 to look at different factors to consider and to render 
15 findings pursuant to the Hall decision. If anything else, 
16 the Hall decision stands for, you better make findings or 
17 else we are going to reverse it. 
18 The finding is that I do find that he is 
19 voluntarily under employed. The factors that go to this 
20 are as follows: The historical perspective of his income 
21 going from a high in 1991 of $140,000 a year, just on 
22 salary, to a low of zero in 1993. There has been 
23 obviously a substantial change. I'm not saying that he 
24 had anything to do with being released from his latest 
25 employment with Southern Aviation and Marina. That was 
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1 beyond his control. I do find that he did not voluntarily 
2 quit that position. Even though the letter of resignation 
3 says what it says, the parole evidence indicates and 
4 explains to the court the reason why, the practicalities 
5 are very reasonable and I accept the representations as 
6 such. 
7 However, I have to consider since his release 
8 from employment of a igh of $140,000 a year what the 
9 defendant has voluntarily chosen to do in this matter. He 
10 has chosen to pursue the area of a certified financial 
11 planner. He was even planning to do that prior to his 
12 termination in 1988 or in 1992 by beginning classes in 
13 that extent. There were many times in his testimony when 
14 asked, upon cross-examination or even direct examination, 
15 if he would choose to go in one area or another. There 
16 were answers to the effect that: I chose to be a 
17 certified financial planner. This is what I had received 
18 my education in. This is what I want to develop. 
19 He did that knowing that start-up time at a 
20 minimum of four to five years will have to occur before 
21 anything of fruition would come of his efforts. He 
22 understood that in coming to an area such as Park City, 
23 Summit County, that he would have to, using his words, 
24 network to create a foundation. 
25 He choose not to accept other employment or to 
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1 look at other employment. Thatf while initially, may be 
2 more than $246 a month, in his opinion would not afford 
3 him, in the long term, any substantial income. And he 
4 indicated that a co-pilot would not have much money, 
5 somewhere in the area of 28 to mid-30,000 a year. But 
6 even in his own estimation as to what he would be making 
7 as a certified financial planner five years hence, he 
8 opines that's possibly a very good income. Then when 
9 pressed further he indicates somewhere in the area of 35 
10 to 40,000 a year. Wherein he understood that there was a 
11 start-up time. 
12 The plaintiff and children should not have to 
13 suffer from his development of his business in that regard 
14 because they certainly have been part of his life up to 
15 that point, and if he chose to take a salaried position, 
16 if he chose to take some other position other than 
17 something that is paying him $246 a month, he very well 
18 could have. 
19 I have to also look at his qualifications as 
20 exhibited by Exhibit Number 4, his resume. He is a 
21 college graduate. He has had additional education as 
22 certified financial planner. He has had armed services 
23 duty, active duty as an officer. He was trained partially 
24 as a pilot but did not complete pilot training but was an 
25 active officer for the U.S. Navy and reserve officer 
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1 retiring as commander. In and of itself, extremely good 
2 references and experience. 
3 However, you take upon it, his substantial work 
4 experience with National Aviation Underwriters, Southern 
5 Marina and Aviation Underwriters, and the many years from 
6 1970 to 1992, a period of 22 years, of which he has held 
7 different positions supervised many people: Was a 
8 vice-president, president, COO, other extremely important 
9 positions in that area. It is true that there are no 
10 comfortable positions available in that area but I must 
11 consider what his assets are as to his work experience, 
12 his education and the observations that the court makes of 
13 the defendant in this matter. 
14 He is 51 years old, appears to be in good health. 
15 He is very articulate. His experience, as I indicated, 
16 would lead one to believe that these skills and assets 
17 that he has as has been indicated by Ms. Romboy 
18 transferred to different other fields. 
19 In examining the testimony of Ms. Romboy, she had 
20 given a range of anywhere from mid-30,000 to $72,000 a 
21 years, she opined, as the national average of available 
22 types of employment. Now that assumes obviously that 
23 there is employment that is available of that nature. 
24 Even being conservative in looking at Ms. Romboy's 
25 testimony, it appears to the court that if Mr. Colburn, 
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1 with his vast experience, his education and his practical 
2 aspects that I find of him to be attractive in that 
3 nature, if he were just to apply himself in any other area 
4 instead of persisting in the certified financial planning 
5 area — he could be selling insurance, although he says he 
6 doesn't believe in the product, and that may have some 
7 limitations on it; he could be selling — working with 
8 IDS, which was a product sales as well as service; he 
9 could be doing stock brokerage, if he completes his 
10 licensing, from six to eight months he indicated that it 
11 would take; there would be no doubt in the court's mind 
12 that he would be successful in, number one, completing 
13 those classes, and number two, receiving his license, and 
14 in the same way that he networks and contacts other 
15 people, that those qualities that I find so admirable in 
16 Mr. Colburn, could also be applied to that situation as a 
17 stock broker, or as a trader or something of that nature. 
18 He could, in my estimation, make an income of at least 
19 $40,000 a year, and I, therefore, impute an income of 
20 $40,000 per year to the defendant for the purposes of 
21 determining child support. That comes out at $3,333 a 
22 month or thereabouts. 
23 I find that the defendant returns between a six 
24 percent computation of return on an IRA versus a five 
25 percent, although percentage wise appears to be very small 
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1 when we are talking about amounts of money as we do. 
2 Practically, it becomes large when you have to consider 
3 the expenses of both parties involved here. 
4 The six percent the court is adopting as a fair 
5 amount. While Mr. Colburn has demonstrated a very keen 
6 ability in the investment field, I think that six percent 
7 return on income is something that although an art, he 
8 artfully can accomplish, even though with the vagaries and 
9 variables of the stock market. In that regard, he would 
10 then have a $1,125 a month non IRS, the Ultra account will 
11 be awarded to him as his separate property. 
12 Mr. Anderson was very candid in indicating that 
13 he did not see any instance, other than the one instance 
14 in which expenses, or living expenses were used from 
15 Ultra. Even then that was a vacation. We would be hard 
16 pressed to say that was a living expense. The Ultra is 
17 awarded to defendant as sole property. But out of that, I 
18 indicate that $583 per month would be that amount that I 
19 would impute, that I would include as to other income from 
20 that fund, leaving a total of $5,041 a month for the 
21 plaintiff — excuse me, for the defendant for purposes of 
22 computing child support. 
23 The plaintiff, on the other hand, has an income 
24 of $2,900 a month. I add to her income $1,125, that would 
25 be her half or her share of the non-IRA funds, giving her 
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1 a total of $4,025 a month. Child support will be computed 
2 on that basis. 
3 In determining alimony, I do have to look at need 
4 and ability to pay. I have to also look at the principal 
5 that the alimony is used for the purpose of not having the 
6 spouse and children become charges of the state. Not 
7 having the spouse become a charge of the state, there is 
8 very little likelihood in this instance that Mrs. Colburn 
9 would ever have to ask for state assistance, however, 
10 there does appear to be a need, their appears to be a need 
11 for following reasons: Number one, there is no marital 
12 residence in this matter. The marital residences were 
13 sold and, true, the money was invested into non-IRA funds 
14 of which she is receiving benefit, but the fact of the 
15 matter is she has an 11-year old son, a 17-year old 
16 daughter who may soon go off the school — at least an 
17 11-year old son which she has to raise for another seven 
18 years without any marital residence. She is renting at 
19 this time and it appears that there is a need to assist 
20 her in her living arrangements as to having a house or 
21 even — her rent at the present time is $1,500 a month. 
22 She very well may be able to purchase a house with a 
23 mortgage payment of $1,500 a month. But regardless of 
24 which, the court finds that there is a need. 
25 There obviously is an ability to pay on behalf of 
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1 the defendant based upon the figures that have been 
2 introduced today as to his share of the Ultra, as well as 
3 his share of the non-IRA accounts. 
4 The $43.70 insurance premium has already been 
5 stipulated to. That will also be paid as part — as 
6 alimony. Would that be part of alimony? 
7 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Child support. 
8 MR. ANDERSON: Child support. 
9 THE COURT: Yes, child support. Thank you. 
10 Now what's the figure she has indicated — the 
11 plaintiff has indicated that she is pursuing her advance 
12 degrees and that is laudable, indicating that a Ph.D would 
13 take approximately five years to complete on a part-time 
14 basis. Accordingly, I award her a thousand dollars a 
15 month alimony for five years. Thereafter it will be 
16 reduced to $500 a month terminated upon any statutory 
17 grounds being present. This is a long term marriage it's 
18 a 22-years marriage. The parties have gone through good 
19 and recently bad times. The $500 a month will be ongoing. 
20 The jewelry, the court has determined, are gifts. 
21 There will be no credits as to those gifts. 
22 The business start-up cost of $11,600 will be 
23 split. $5,800 will be awarded to the plaintiff. 
24 The automobiles, the court, for convenience will 
25 put the Subaru at $1,500. The Volvo at three — 
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1 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: $15,000. 
2 THE COURT: $15,000. The Volvo at $3f000. the 
3 balance is $12,000. Mr. Anderson, I applaud you as to 
4 your creative accounting but I have to agree with 
5 Mr. Christiansen, that 12,000 is what I see as the 
6 difference, and the defendant will be given credit for 
7 that $12,000. 
8 The Navy retirement as — and I read over that 
9 case and it in the number of cases — divorce cases and 
10 retirements that have come since Woodward. It amazes me 
11 there hasn't been a case directly on point regarding Navy 
12 retirement. Maybe it's because of my interpretation of 
13 Woodward or the other courts' interpretation of Woodward 
14 may have taken that into account, but I'm going to apply 
15 Woodward as it is, which would come out to be, I believe, 
16 34 percent. And I agree with Mr. Christiansen, 
17 Mr. Anderson, if you want to fight the Navy and get all 
18 that done, that's fine. If you can get some sort of cash 
19 value, get credit, that probably is the best way, allowing 
20 the defendant to maintain all of his with some credit as 
21 to current value. That is up to you. 
22 MR. ANDERSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Tax deduction is to be given to the 
24 plaintiff, who obviously needs it the most at this time. 
25 The taxable income, in the event that there comes a time 
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1 when the tax deduction would be more beneficial to the 
2 defendant, then that would be subject to court order on 
3 that. 
4 One question that I had was that there was 
5 unresolved issue of whether or not there should be a term 
6 life insurance or life insurance naming the children as 
7 beneficiaries of that insurance. This is going to be a 
8 little bit unusual but I will explain my reasoning. The 
9 defendant will maintain a $75,000 term life insurance 
10 naming the youngest child as beneficiary thereof up until 
11 the age of 18. That will not begin until after the 
12 daughter reaches majority and then there will be the 
13 75f000 term insurance on the defendant's life naming the 
14 beneficiary the youngest child. The reason I did that is 
15 that in the event something does happen, catastrophically 
16 to this whole situation, at least this youngest child will 
17 have the college fund as well as additional $75,000 term 
18 insurance to be applied to his future needs and college. 
19 I take that into consideration in comparing the daughter 
20 now has approximately $75,000 for college and that is why 
21 I am doing it in that manner. 
22 What have I left out? 
23 MR. ANDERSON: Attorneys fees. 
24 THE COURT: Attorneys fees. Each pay their own 
25 attorneys fees. I did have that written down. Thank you 
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1 for reminding me. 
2 MR. ANDERSON: Is there anything else we haven't 
3 agreed to? 
4 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I think that's it. 
5 THE COURT: Personal property will be divided. I 
6 think they where in the process of doing that. 
7 THE COLBURN: We finished. 
8 THE COURT: Stipulated as to one-half uncovered 
9 per statute. Plaintiff will get the return of the $2,000 
10 advance that was part of the agreed upon terms. 
11 MR. ANDERSON: I think that's everything 
12 according to — did you wish that I prepare the finding 
13 and decree? 
14 THE COURT: I think if you want to make a stab at 
15 that, Mr. Anderson, submit it to Mr. Christiansen for 
16 approval prior to the court's signature. 
17 MR. ANDERSON: Will do that. 
18 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Did you prepare a work sheet? 
19 MR. ANDERSON: Yeah. 
20 THE COURT: Anything else? 
21 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: That's it. 
22 THE COURT: We are in recess. 
23 (Proceedings concluded.) 
24 
25 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 13 
00U08u 
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6 in and for the State of Utah; that as such reporter, I 
7 reported the occasion of the proceedings of the 
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13 ruling in said proceedings. 
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ADDENDUM 2 
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ESQ. #0 91 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY ELIZABETH COLBURN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES ROBERT COLBURN, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 944300069DA 
) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This case came on for trial in the above Court on September 
13, 1994, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding. Plaintiff 
appeared and was represented by her counsel, John B. Anderson, and 
Defendant appeared and was represented by his counsel, Terry 
Christiansen. Prior to trial the parties had settled a number of 
issues, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the 
question of child custody; (2) the proper division and distribution 
of certain IRA and non-IRA securities and savings accounts, which 
had been divided pursuant to a prior court order; (3) the division 
and distribution of the cash value of a life insurance policy owned 
by Defendant; and the. division and distribution of certain personal 
property. The remaining issues were fully tried by the court, 
after presentation of witness testimony and other tangible 
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evidence. Being fully advised in the premises, the Court now 
enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendants were actual and bona fide 
residents of Summit County, State of Utah, for more than three 
months immediately preceding the commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 1, 1973 
in San Francisco, California, and since that time have been and now 
are wife and husband. 
3. There are irreconcilable differences of this marriage. 
Plaintiff and Defendant have maintained separate residences since 
June of 1994, and there is no likelihood of reconciliation. 
4. Plaintiff and Defendant have two children born as issue of 
this marriage, namely: MICHELLE RENEE COLBURN, born March 19, 1977, 
now age 17; and, JAMES ANDREW COLBURN, born April 12, 1983 now age 
11. Plaintiff has had sole physical custody of the parties 
children since the parties last lived with each other, and 
Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awarded sole legal care, 
custody and control of the minor children as part of the decree of 
divorce in this case. 
5. Defendant is self-employed as a certified financial 
planner currently earning approximately $264.00 per month, having 
previously worked as a high level executive in the aviation 
insurance industry. 
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6. In June of 1992, Defendant resigned from his last place of 
employ, Southern Marine and Aviation. This resignation was 
submitted at the request of his employer, and was prompted by 
corporate downsizing. 
7. Defendant's earned income in the aviation insurance 
business during his last three years of employment was as follows: 
1990 $129,802.00 
1991 $140,585.00 
1992 $126,286.00 
8. Defendant attempted to locate employment as an executive 
in the aviation insurance industry for several months after losing 
his -hob at Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters. However, 
there were no jobs available as a result of the contracting 
aviation underwriting industry. The only -IJob offers Defendant 
received was selling life insurance for New York Life at $13,000.00 
per year and selling financial products/insurance for IDS at 
$23,000 per year. Defendant voluntarily chose not to accept the 
job offers with New York Life of IDS or look for or accept other 
salaried employment. 
8(a). The Defendant possesses job skills which could be 
transferred to other employment. However, Defendant voluntarily 
chose not to seek or accept employment in other areas. Defendant 
persists in pursuing a career as a certified financial planner 
which he began planning even before he left Southern Marine. 
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9. Defendant chose instead to relocate to Park City, Utah and 
establish a practice as a certified financial planner. Defendant 
had begun his education for a certificate in this field in 1986. 
10. Defendant, who is a well educated college graduate and in 
good health, has other qualifications and skills, developed during 
his prior employment as a high level executive in the insurance 
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transferred to different or other fields of employment. 
11. At the time he relocated to Park City, Utah, Defendant 
knew that he would be unable to generate income comparable to his 
historical salary, and that it would take four (4) to five (5) 
years to establish a secure and profitable business. Based upon 
these facts, and the fact that Defendant voluntarily chose not to 
pursue or accept other salaried employment, the court specifically 
finds that Defendant is voluntarily underemployed. 
12. Based upon his work history, historical income, 
occupational qualifications and prevailing earnings of people of 
similar backgrounds in this community, and the testimony of experts 
the court finds that Defendant could earn a minimum salary of 
$40,000.00 per year, should he choose to remedy his voluntary 
underemployment. 
13. Plaintiff is 42 years of age, in good health, and has a 
college education. Plaintiff is currently employed as a certified 
nurse at a salary of $2,900.00 per month. 
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14. Plaintiff, who had been unemployed for a great part of 
the marriage, obtained this employment as a means of support after 
Defendant chose to set up a practice as a certified financial 
planner. 
15. Pursuant to the mutual agreement of the parties and an 
order issued by the Honorable David Young, at a hearing to 
determine temporary support, the parties divided equally their non-
IRA accounts, totaling approximately $450,000.00, acquired during 
marriage; it is just and equitable that the court adopt that 
division and distribution. 
16. A reasonable and expected rate of return on the above 
referenced non-IRA funds is six percent (6%) per annum. 
Accordingly, each party should earn $1,125.00 per month in interest 
on those non-IRA funds, and this amount shall be added to each 
parties' income and used in calculating child support. 
17. Defendant is the owner of an additional ULTRA investment 
account, which is his sole and separate property, having acquired 
the funds to purchase that account via an inheritance from his 
father. The account was worth approximately $61,220.67, as of the 
date of trial. The imputed rate of return on that account, at six 
percent (6%) per annum, is $306.10 per month, and that amount shall 
also be added onto Defendant's income for purposes of calculating 
child support. 
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18. The child support award for the parties1 two (2) minor 
children should be based upon the following income figures: (1) 
Defendant's monthly income is $4,764.43 (imputed income of 
$3,333.33 due to voluntary underemployment, $1,125.00 in interest 
income from non-IRA investment accounts, and $306.10 in interest 
income from the ULTRA account) and Plaintifffs monthly income is 
$4,025 ($2,900.00 in salary and $1,125.00 in interest income from 
non-IRA investment accounts). 
19. The Defendant should pay $703.57 per month as and for 
support of the parties1 two minor children, or $351.78 per month 
per child, until such time as the children reach eighteen (18) 
years of age and graduate from school in their normal and expected 
year of graduation, whichever is later. Payment of such support 
shall commence on October 1, 1994, and be due and payable to 
Plaintiff on the 1st day of each month thereafter. 
20. Plaintiff is currently enrolled at the University of Utah 
pursuing an advanced degree. It will take Plaintiff approximately 
five (5) years to complete her education. 
21. Without additional education Plaintiff will be unable to 
advance in her career or obtain the salary or wages necessary to 
support herself in the manner to which she has been accustomed 
22. Plaintiff's expenses currently exceed her monthly income 
and Plaintiff has a specific need for alimony to support herself. 
The need for support will be greater while she obtains her advanced 
degree and it is just and equitable that Defendant pay to Plaintiff 
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the sum of $1,000.00 per month as and for alimony. This obligation 
shall commence as of October 1, 1994, and shall be due and payable 
on the 1st day of each month thereafter. Alimony shall terminate 
upon Plaintiff's death, re-marriage or co-habitation with a person 
of the opposite sex. 
23. At this time the parties have no marital residence, and 
the court finds that Plaintiff will need to purchase a home to 
replace the one the parties previously sold. An award of alimony 
is necessary to assist her in meeting these costs and in obtaining 
suitable living arrangements. 
24. Defendant, who has been awarded property of significant 
value, including, but not limited to, non-IRA accounts valued at 
the approximate amount of $225,000.00 and the ULTRA account valued 
at the approximately $63,000.00, has the ability to pay such 
alimony to Plaintiff. 
25. It is contemplated that Plaintiff will complete her 
advanced degree after five (5) years, and that at that time she 
will have a greater ability to support herself. Therefore in 
contemplation of the future increase in income and the fact that 
this is a long term marriage, after five (5) years Defendant's 
alimony obligation shall be reduced to $500.00 per month, which 
amount shall be ongoing, unless terminated on statutory grounds. 
26. The various items of jewelry listed on Plaintiff's 
financial statements were gifts to her, and are therefore her sole 
and separate property, free and clear from any claim by Defendant. 
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27. The parties recently invested $11,600.00 in Defendant's 
business, Summit Financial Advisors Group, Inc., as start up costs. 
Defendant should pay over to Plaintiff the sum of $5,800.00 as and 
for her share of the those costs. The Defendant is awarded the 
business free and clear from any claim of Plaintiff. 
28. Plaintiff is awarded the 1993 Suburu automobile, which is 
valued at $15,000.00, as her sole and separate property. Defendant 
is awarded the 1982 Volvo automobile, which is valued at $3,000.00, 
as his sole and separate property. Defendant should be given a 
$12,000.00 credit against sums he may owe to Plaintiff, to equalize 
the differences in value. 
29. Defendant has a retirement benefit from his service in 
the Navy. Sixty eight percent (68%) of this benefit was earned 
during the period in which the parties were married. Applying the 
formula set out in Woodward, rather than the naval point system, 
Plaintiff should be awarded 34% of Defendant's naval retirement 
benefit as her sole and separate property. 
30. Plaintiff, at her sole option, may either seek to obtain 
the present cash value of her interest in the naval pension from 
the department of the navy, if possible, or may elect to have a 
qualified domestic relations order, or its equivalent, issued 
permitting her to collect her share of the pension directly from 
the navy at the time Defendant begins drawing payments thereunder. 
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31. Defendant should cooperate with Plaintiff in obtaining 
the qualified domestic relations order if Plaintiff elects that 
option, and should also execute all documents necessary to preserve 
and protect Plaintiff's interest in the naval pension. Plaintiff 
shall be responsible for the preparation of any Qualified Domestic 
Relation Order regarding the Navy retirement and shall bear the 
costs associated therewith. 
32. Plaintiff has the greater need for the state and federal 
tax exemptions provided for the parties1 two (2) children. 
Plaintiff will also be better able to use the exemptions. In the 
event that there comes a time when the tax deduction would be more 
beneficial to the Defendant, then that would be subject to court 
order on that. 
33. Defendant is the owner of a USSA life insurance policy, 
which policy was acquired during marriage. This policy should be 
sold each party shall receive one-half (1/2) of its present cash 
value, provided that no value has been lost or withdrawn since the 
date of trial. 
34. The parties have reached a mutual and amicable agreement 
regarding a division of their personal property and household 
goods, and it would be just and equitable for the court to adopt 
and sanction that division. The specific items of personal 
property to be awarded to each party are set forth in Exhibit "A" 
and Exhibit "B", attached hereto and incorporated by reference. 
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35. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired 
IRA plans, which are currently held in Charles Schwab Accounts. 
The IRA held in Defendant's name has a current estimated value of 
$580,000.00 and the IRA account held in Plaintiff's name has a 
current estimated value of $28,000.00. It would be just and 
equitable that the two (2) accounts be divided equally between the 
parties, with each party to have a separate account. 
36. During the course of the marriage, Defendant acquired 
interests in three (3) limited partnerships; identified in the 
pleadings as CalPlans Vinyards, Old Perin Square, and S. Presal 
Cottonwood Ltd. Defendant acquired these interests via inheritance 
from his father, and has not commingled them with any marital 
account. 
37. Plaintiff has recently expended $2,000.00 of her personal 
funds on educational purposes for the benefit of the parties• 
oldest child. The parties have established a uniform gift to 
minors account designed to cover such expenses, and it would be 
just and equitable for the Plaintiff to be reimbursed from the 
account in the amount of $2,000.00. 
38. Plaintiff has available through her place of employment 
medical insurance, which she purchases for the parties' two minor 
children. The total cost of the insurance that may be attributed 
to the children is $87.40; accordingly Defendant's share of that 
cost is $43.70. This amount should be paid with monthly child 
support. 
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39. It would be just and proper that the parties share 
equally all other medical, dental and optical costs incurred on 
behalfk of the parties1 children, until such time as the child 
reaches eighteen (18) years of age and graduates from high school 
in his or her normal year of graduation. 
40. It would be just and equitable that Defendant purchase 
and/or maintain a life insurance policy in the amount of 
$75,000.00, naming the parties1 youngest child as the sole and 
exclusive beneficiary thereon, to provide for that child in the 
event that Defendant dies before that child reaches the age of 
majority. 
41. The parties have established uniform gift to minors 
accounts on behalf of both of their children, and it would be just 
and equitable for Plaintiff to be named as an additional custodian 
on the accounts. 
42. The parties each have sufficient resources to pay their 
ov/n costs and attorney's fees incurred in this matter, and it would 
be just and equitable that each pay their own costs and fees. 
43. The parties have no marital debt, and each should be 
solely responsible for any debt incurred after the date of 
separation in this matter, and hold each other harmless from any 
claims thereon. It would be just and equitable for Plaintiff to 
assume the lease payments on the home in Park City where she is 
residing. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the 
complaint and personal jurisdiction over the parties hereto, 
2. Plaintiff should be awarded a divorce from Defendant and 
Defendant should be awarded a divorce from Plaintiff. 
3. The Decree of Divorce should become final and absolute 
immediately upon the Court signing it and the Clerk of the Court 
entering it in the Register of Actions. 
4. Plaintiff should be awarded sole care, custody and control 
over the parties' two minor children, subject to Defendant's rights 
to reasonable visitation. Defendant's rights to visitation shall be 
determined by the mutual agreement of the parties; in the event 
that the parties are unable to agree, visitation shall be as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann., Section 3 0-5-5. 
5. Defendant should pay child support to Plaintiff in the 
amount of $703.57, commencing on October 1, 1994, and payable 
thereafter on the first day of each month. Such child support 
shall continue until the parties' minor children reach eighteen 
(18) years of age and graduate from school in their normal and 
expected year of graduation. This award shall be subject to a 
withhold and deliver order, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.. Section 
62A-11-501, et.seq. 
6. Defendant should pay over to Plaintiff one half of all 
medical insurance costs incurred by Plaintiff on behalf of the 
parties1 minor children. Currently Defendant's share of these 
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costs is $43.70 per month, and this amount should be paid on the 
1st day of each month, commencing October 1, 1994. 
7. Plaintiff should purchase medical and accident insurance 
for and on behalf of the parties minor children, so long as it is 
available through her place of employment. 
8. The parties shall share equally all other uncovered 
medical, dental, and optical costs incurred on behalf of their 
minor children, including deductibles, until such time as the 
children reach eighteen (18) years of age and graduate from high 
school in their normal and expected year of graduation. 
9. Defendant should maintain a life insurance policy in the 
amount of $75,000.00 naming the parties youngest child as the sole 
and exclusive beneficiary thereon, until such time as the parties1 
youngest child reaches eighteen years of age and graduates from 
high school in his normal and expected year of graduation. 
10. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,000.00 per 
month as and for alimony. This obligation shall commence on 
October 1, 1994, and shall be due and payable on the first day of 
each month thereafter. Defendant's alimony obligation shall be 
reduced to $500.00 per month after five (5) years, and this amount 
shall be ongoing, unless Plaintiff re-marries dies, or cohabits 
with a person of the opposite sex. 
11. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate 
property, free from any claim by Defendant, the 1993 Suburu 
automobile, and Defendant should be awarded as his sole and 
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separate property, free from any claim by Plaintiff, the 19 82 Volvo 
automobile. Defendant should be awarded a credit of $12,000.00 to 
equalize the differences in value. 
12. Defendant should pay over to Plaintiff $5,800.00 as her 
share of the start up costs the parties invested in Defendant's 
business venture. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and 
separate property, free from any claim by Plaintiff, all interest 
in Summit Financial Advisors Group, Inc. 
13. Defendant should sell the USSA life insurance policy 
acquired during marriage, and pay over to Plaintiff one-half (1/2) 
of its present cash value, provided that no value has been lost or 
withdrawn since the date of trial. If value has been lost or 
withdrawn, then Defendant shall pay over to Plaintiff one-half of 
the value of the policy as of the date of the divorce. 
14. Plaintiff is entitled to 34% of Defendant's naval 
retirement account, and may, at her sole option, either collect a 
cash equivalent of the present value of that interest, if permitted 
by the Navy, or obtain her interest in monthly increments once 
Defendant begins to collect the pension. Plaintiff should be 
responsible for obtaining a Qualified Domestic Relations Order or 
its equivalent from the Navy, at her sole cost and expense, and 
Defendant should cooperate in obtaining such an order and in 
protecting Plaintiff's interest in that retirement account. 
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15. The parties should immediately divide their IRA accounts 
held with Charles Schwab, with each party having a one-half (1/2) 
interest in the IRA account held in the others name, 
16. Plaintiff should be reimbursed in the amount of $2,000.00 
for educational expenses she incurred on behalf of the parties 
oldest child. This $2,000.00 should be drawn from the uniform gift 
to minors account that the parties have set up in the name of the 
parties1 oldest child. 
17. Plaintiff should be added as an additional custodian on 
the children's uniform gifts to minors accounts. 
18. The court should sanction the division of personal 
property and household goods mutually agreed to by the parties, and 
as set forth in the findings of fact heretofore entered by the 
Court. 
19. Each party should pay their own costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in prosecuting and defending this matter. 
20. Plaintiff should be awarded the federal and state income 
tax exemptions available for the parties1 minor childr^^1 T" the 
event that there comes a time when the tax deduction would be more 
beneficial to the Defendant, then that would be subject to court 
order on that. 
21. Plaintiff should be awarded all right, title and 
interest in her jewelry, free and clear from any claim of 
Defendant, the same being her separate property having acquired it 
by gift. 
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22. Defendant should be awarded all right, title and interest 
in the ULTRA investment account, the CalPlans Vinyards, Old Perin 
Square, and S. Presal Cottonwood Ltd., free and clear from any 
claim of Defendant, the same being his separate property having 
acquired them via inheritance from his father. 
23. The parties, who had no marital debt at the time of 
separation, should each assume as their sole and separate debt any 
indebtedness incurred by them after the date of separation and hold 
each other harmless from any claim thereon. Plaintiff should 
assume the lease payments on her residence in Park City, and hold 
Defendant harmless from any claims thereon. 
24. The court sanctions the division of the non-IRA accounts 
acquired by the parties during the course of the marriage, as 
ordered by the Honorable Judge David Young, and as previously 
accomplished by the parties. 
25. Each party shall be responsible for any tax consequences 
that may arise as a result of the division of the assets and 
accounts awarded to them in this action, and should indemnify and 
hold the other harmless from any claim thereon. 
DATED this ?^day of Mtf/tje&L ,
 1995. 
HONORABLE GLENN IWASAKI 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM 3 
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ESQ. #091 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
623 East First South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY ELIZABETH COLBURN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
JAMES ROBERT COLBURN, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) Civil No. 944300069DA 
) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This case came on for trial in the above Court on September 
13, 1994, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding. Plaintiff 
appeared and was represented by her counsel, John B. Anderson, and 
Defendant appeared and was represented by his counsel, Terry 
Christiansen. Prior to trial the parties had settled a number of 
issues, including, but not limited to, the following: (i) the 
question of child custody; (2) the proper division and distribution 
of certain IRA and non-IRA securities and savings accounts, which 
had been divided pursuant to a prior court order; (3) the division 
and distribution of the cash value of a life insurance policy ov/ned 
by Defendant; and the division and distribution of certain personal 
property- The remaining issues were fully tried by the court, 
after full presentation of the testimony of witnesses and other 
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tangible evidence. The Court being duly advised in the premises 
and having entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a divorce from Defendant and the bonds 
of matrimony heretofore existing between Plaintiff and Defendant 
are hereby dissolved. 
2. This Decree shall become final and absolute immediately 
upon the Clerk of the Court entering it in the Register of Actions. 
3. Plaintiff, the mother is hereby awarded the sole legal 
care, custody and control of the two (2) minor children born as 
issue of this marriage, namely: MICHELLE RENEE COLBURN, born March 
19, 1977, now age 17; and, JAMES ANDREW COLBURN, born April 12, 
1983 now age 11, subject to Defendant's rights to reasonable 
visitation. Defendant's rights to visitation shall be determined by 
the mutual agreement of the parties; in the event that the parties 
are unable to agree, visitation shall be as set forth in Utah Code 
Ann., Section 30-3-35. 
4. Defendant shall pay child support to Plaintiff in the 
amount of $703.57 per month, commencing on October 1, 1994, and 
payable thereafter on the first day of each month. Such child 
support shall continue until the parties1 minor children reach 
eighteen (18) years of age and graduate from school in their normal 
and expected year of graduation. This award shall be subject to a 
withhold and deliver order, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 
62A-11-501, et.seq. 
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5. Defendant shall pay over to Plaintiff the sum of $43.70 on 
the 1st day of each month, commencing October 1, 1994, as and for 
his share of the medical insurance costs incurred by Plaintiff on 
behalf of the parties1 minor children. 
6. Plaintiff shall purchase medical and accident insurance 
for and on behalf of the parties minor children, so long as it is 
available through her place of employment. 
7. The parties shall share equally all other uncovered 
medical, dental, and optical costs incurred on behalf of their 
minor children, including deductibles, until such time as the 
children reach eighteen (18) years of age and graduate from high 
school in their normal and expected year of graduation. 
8. Defendant shall purchase and/or maintain a term life 
insurance policy in the amount of $75,000.00 naming the parties 
youngest child as the sole and exclusive beneficiary thereon, and 
shall maintain that policy until such time as the parties1 youngest 
child reaches eighteen years of age and graduates from high school 
in his normal and expected year of graduation. 
9. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,000.00 per 
month as and for alimony. This obligation shall commence on 
October 1, 1994, and shall be due and payable on the first day of 
each month thereafter. Defendant's alimony obligation shall be 
reduced to $500.00 per month after five (5) years, and this amount 
shall be ongoing. Notwithstanding the foregoing, alimony shall 
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automatically terminate at such time as Plaintiff dies, re-marries 
or cohabits with a person of the opposite sex. 
10. Plaintiff shall be awarded as her sole and separate 
property, free from any claim by Defendant, the 199 3 Suburu 
automobile, and Defendant should be awarded as his sole and 
separate property, free from any claim by Plaintiff, the 1982 Volvo 
automobile. Defendant should be awarded a credit of $12,000.00 to 
equalize the differences in value. 
11. Defendant shall pay over to Plaintiff $5,800.00 as her 
share of the start up costs the parties invested in Defendants 
business venture. Defendant shall be awarded as his sole and 
separate property, free from any claim by Plaintiff, all interest 
in Summit Financial Advisors Group, Inc., and shall indemnify and 
hold Plaintiff harmless from any claims made against that entity. 
12. Defendant shall pay over to Plaintiff one-half (1/2) of 
the present cash value of in the USSA life insurance policy 
acquired during marriage, provided that value has not been lost or 
withdrawn from the policy since the date of the trial in this 
matter. In the event that value has been lost or withdrawn, 
Defendant shall pay over one-half (1/2) of the cash value of the 
policy as of the date of trial in this matter. 
13. Plaintiff is entitled to 34% of Defendant's naval 
retirement account, and may, at her sole option, either collect a 
cash equivalent of the present value of that interest, if permitted 
by the Navy, or may obtain her interest in monthly increments once 
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Defendant begins to collect the pension. Defendant and the United 
States Navy will execute any and all documents necessary to 
protect, preserve and distribute Plaintiff's interest in the naval 
retirement account. Plaintiff's counsel will obtain and prepare 
all necessary documents, at Plaintiff's sole cost and expense. 
14. The parties shall immediately divide their IRA accounts 
held with Charles Schwab, with each party having a one-half (1/2) 
interest in the IRA account held in the others name. 
15. Plaintiff shall be reimbursed in the amount of $2,000.00 
for educational expenses she incurred on behalf of the parties 
oldest child. This $2,000.00 shall be drawn from the uniform gift 
to minors account that the parties have set up in the name of the 
parties' oldest child. Plaintiff will be responsible for any tax 
consequences that may arise from these transactions. 
16. Plaintiff shall be added as an additional custodian on 
the children's uniform gifts to minors accounts. 
17. The court shall sanction the division of personal 
property and household goods mutually agreed to by the parties, and 
as set forth in the findings of fact heretofore entered by the 
Court. 
18. Each party should pay their own costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in prosecuting and defending this matter. 
19. Plaintiff should be awarded the federal and state income 
tax exemptions available for the parties1 minor children. In the 
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event that there comes a time when the tax deduction would be more 
beneficial to the Defendant then that shall be subject to court 
order on that. 
20. The court sanctions the division of the non-IRA accounts 
as ordered by the Honorable Judge David Young, and as previously 
accomplished by the parties. 
21. The Plaintiff is awarded all of her jewelry as her sole 
and separate property, free of any claim from Defendant, the same 
having been acquired by gift. 
22. Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property, 
free from any claim of Plaintiff, the ULTRA investment account, the 
interest in CalPlans Vineyards, Old Perin Square, and S. Presal 
Cottonwood Ltd., the same having been acquired by inheritance from 
his father. 
23. The parties had no marital debt at the time of 
separation, and any debt incurred by either party since the date of 
separation shall be the sole responsibility of that party, and each 
should hold the other harmless from any claim thereon. Plaintiff is 
required to assume the lease payments on the Park City home where 
she is residing. 
24. Each party shall be responsible for any tax consequences 
that may arise as a result of the assets and accounts awarded to 
them in this action. 
6 
DATED this i M2-day of V^-. 1995. 
BY THE 
""GLENN IWASAK 
District Court Judge 
> /C4^<^r - ^ — • 
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writ of certiorari are granted and the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals is re-
versed. The case is remanded with in-
structions that it be returned to the Dis-
trict Court for entry of a judgment of 
acquittal." {Watts v. United States, $v-
l>r,i, 394 U.S. p. 708, 89 S.Cl. p. 1402, 22 
L.Ed.2d pp. 667-GfiH.) 
The trial court's conclusion HS a matter of 
law that Rubin's remarks were not a "true" 
solicitation in violation of Penal Code sec-
tion 653f but were embraced in the First 
Amendment as permitted speech, in my 
opinion follows the law thus enunciated. 
I would affirm. 
Hearing denied; BIRD, C. J,, and MOSK, 
J., dissenting. 
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Jjn re the MARKIAGK of Daniel G. 
POITE and Josephine A. I'oppc-
Daniel G. Poppc, Petitioner 
and Appellant, 
And 
Josephine A. I'oppe, Respondent, 
Civ. 20642. 
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 
Division 2. 
Sept. 17, 1979. 
On requests by former husband and 
former wife for modification of provisions 
of the court's judgment in a marriage disso-
lution proceeding, the Superior Courtt Or-
ange County, James K. Turner, J.} rendered 
judgment from which the former husband 
appealed. The Court of Appeal, Kaufman, 
JM held that: (J) notwithstanding certain 
statements by the court in earlier hearing, 
court's statement that wife had right to 
ie apply for and obtain her portion of naval 
*- pension benefits was reservation of jurfodie-
i- tion which permitted wife to thereafter an. 
'- ply for order quantifying her interest and 
( permitted court to make appropriate appor-
f
- tionment; (2) apportionment made on basis 
 of years in service during marriage before 
separation as compared to "qualifying" 
years in service, such apportionment bear-
 ing no substantial relationship to amount of 
:- the pension, was erroneous, and (3) proof of 
t change in circumstances is required for 
y modification of spousal support but con-
I. verse is not necessarily true, and fact that 
daughter had departed from residence 
shared by mother and daughter did not 
require finding of abuse of discretion on 
part of trial court in declining to reduce 
amount of, or to terminate, spousal support. 
Order reversed in part, with directions, 
and otherwise affirmed. 
1. Divorce «=»240.1 
Notwithstanding statements hy tho 
court, in dissolution proceeding, that what 
husband had accumulated by points toward 
his navy pension prior to time of marriage 
was 100% his separate property and that 
wife was entitled to an amount based on 
number of years to date of separation that 
she had been married to him and was enti-
tled to one half as community vested prop-
erty interest as of such time, court's state-
ment that wife had right to apply for and 
obtain her portion of the benefit was reser-
vation of jurisdiction which permitted wife 
to thereafter apply for order quantifying 
her interest and permitted court to make 
appropriate apportionment. 
2. Divorce <&=>252.3(4) 
Apportionment of husband's naval pen-
sion made by trial court in marriage disso-
lution proceeding on basis of years in ser-
vice during marriage before separation as 
compared to "qualifying" years in service, 
such apportionment bearing no substantia) 
relationship to amount of the pension, was 
erroneous. 
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3. Divorce $=*252.3(4) 
. The "time rule" is apparently method 
most frequently employed for apportioning 
retirement benefits between community 
and separate estates but is not the only 
acceptable method and is appropriate only 
wfiere amount of retirement benefits is sub-
stantially related to number of years of 
service. 
4. Divorce » 2 4 5 ( 2 , 3), 247 
I Proof of change in circumstances is re-
quired for modification of spousal support, 
but converse is not necessarily true, and 
fact that daughter had departed from resi-
dence shared by mother and daughter did 
not require finding of abuse of discretion on 
pa|rt of trial court in declining to reduce, 
amount of, or to terminate, spousal support. 
5. JDivorce «*=> 252.3(4) 
', Basis for apportionment of naval re-
serve pension as between separate and com-
munity estates on dissolution of marriage 
was matter committed to judicial discretion 
of | trial court, subject to requirement that 
apportionment be reasonable and fairly rep-
resentative of relative contributions of com* 
miinity and separate estate. 
James F. Rccs, Long Beach, for petitioner 
and appellant. 
James F. I^ eck, New|>ort Beach, for re-
spondent 
J O P I N I O N 
&AUFMAN, Associate Justice. 
The marriage of the parties was dissolved 
by a final judgment on January 30, 1974, 
referring to and incorporating the provi-
sions of an interlocutory judgment entered 
on! November 9, 1973. Daniel G, Poppe 
(hereafter former husband) appeals from an 
order of the court dated September 18, 
1978, denying his request that spousal sup-
port be decreased or terminated and grant-
ing the application of Josephine A. Poppe 
(former wife) for "modification" of the 
judgment by fixing her interest in the Na-
val Rcscrvo pension being received by for-
med husband on the basis of the "time rule" 
Hi one-half the fraction 27.25/31.50, the nu-
merator being the number of years of re-
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servo service during the marriage before 
separation and the denominator being the 
number of former husband's "qualifying" 
years of service, which amount* to $253.60 
of the total of $592 per month presently 
being received. 
Naval Reserve Pension 
Former husband entered the Navy on 
July 1, 1937. He served on active duty 
from that date until July 18,1946, at which 
time he became a member of the Naval 
Reserve. On February 23,1946, the parties 
were married. The parties separated on 
June 16, 1973, and their marriage wasjsub-
Bequcntly dissolved as previously indicated. 
After the separation of the parties former 
husband continued serving in the Naval Re-
serve until he retired on October 31, 1977. 
He commenced receiving pension payments 
on November 80, 1977. 
Retirement benefits paid to Navy person-
nel retiring from active duty are based on 
the number of years served and the amount 
of the retiree's salary during active service. 
Contrastingly, the amount of the pension 
paid to Naval Reserve retirees is a percent-
age of the base pay for the rank achieved 
arrived at on the basis of the number of 
points accumulated by the retiree during 
his service in the Naval Reserve. Essential-
ly one point is earned for each drill attend-
ed. For example, 14 or 15 points would be 
earned during the annual two weeks' train-
ing duty. For periods of active duty, one 
point is credited for each day. To be eligi-
ble for retirement a Naval Reservist must 
have been credited with a minimum number 
of "qualifying" years of service, that is, 
years in which 60 or more points were 
earned. However, if the minimum "quali-
fying" years requirement is met, all points 
earned are counted in the calculation of the 
pension notwithstanding that in some years 
less than 50 points were earned. 
Former husband retired with a total of 
5,002 points of which more than 8,000 were 
earned during the period he was on active 
duty prior to the marriage. The number of 
points accumulated during the marriage 
was 1,632. The balance of former hus-
band's points were earned by him for his 
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participation in the Naval Reserve after the 
separation of the parties. It was former 
huahancTb contention in the trial court that 
former wife's interest in the pension should 
be computed hy multiplying one-half times 
the fraction 1632/5002 times the amount of 
the pension, $592 per month. Apportioning 
the pension in that fashion, former wife's 
share would amount to approximately 
$98.50 per month, and former husband had 
been paying that sum to former wife. 
However, the trial court determined that 
former husband's "qualifying:" years totaled 
31.50 and apportioned the pension on the 
basis of the "time rule" by dividing: the 
27.25 years between marriage and separa-
tion by the 3W> "qualifying" years so that 
former wife's share amounts to $253.60 per 
month,1 
Former husband first contends that the 
Naval Reserve pension was divided by the 
court in the interlocutory judgment of dis-
J_s solution in {accordance with his point ratio 
theory, that that determination has lung 
since become final and that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to alter the division long 
since and finally made. Not so. 
In numbered paragraph 4 of the interloc-
utory judgment the court purported to di-
vide the community property. It dealt with 
items "a" through "e," none of which was 
the Naval Reserve retirement benefits. 
1. Former husband contends that even if the 
trial court's apportionment were otherwise cor-
rect, the denominator should have been the full 
3G or 37 years he WAS in the service. Since we 
conclude the basis for apportionment employed 
by the remit was inappropriate, we do not 
reach this question. 
2. the dialogue in its entirety reads: "Now on 
this Naval time the Court has to order that at 
such time as you reach 60 or at such time as 
you apply—Mrs, Poppe, if this man never ap-
plies for Naval retirement, you never get it. I 
can't he more clear. You never get it if he 
never applies. All right. Because that's within 
his power and control. All ripht. Once he 
applies mid once lie gets it, then you're going to 
get an appropriate amount based on the num-
ber of years to the date of separation that you 
were married lo him. You are entitled to one-
half as a community vested property interest as 
of that time. 
"Now Mr. Pop|>e, you continue on with Na-
val service, Everything hereafter you get full 
credit; it's all yours. So, he'll be getting more 
Numbered paragraph 5 read: "The COURT 
FURTHER ORDERS that respondent (for-
mer wife] has a right to apply for and 
obtain on© half of petitioner's fformer hus-
band's] military pension benefits accrued 
between February 23, 1046 and June 16, 
1973 when petitioner (former husband) is 
eligible to obtain said benefits." 
[1] Former husband contends that the 
court's intention to divide the retirement 
benefits in accordance with former hus-
band's ratio theory is evident from a dia-
logue between the court and former bus* 
band near the conclusion of the dissolution 
hearing in which the court stated to former 
husband: "What you accumulated by points 
toward your pension prior to the time of 
marriage is a hundred }>erccnt your sepa-
rate property." We cannot agree. 
During the same dialogue the court stat-
ed, apparently to former wife: "Once he 
[former husband] applies and once he gets 
it [the pensionj, then you're going to get an 
appropriate amount based on the number of 
years to the date of separation that yov 
were married to him. You are entitled to 
one-half as a community vested property 
interest as of that time." (Emphasis add-
ed.) We think it rather clear from the 
entire statement of the court2 itaken to- J l 
than you get, hut the Court will order that you 
pay that proportionate [.share] at such lime as 
you apply. And when you receive it and upon 
receipt, then that proportionate share, you're 
going to have to pay over to your wife, this 
wife, Mrs. Poppc. 
"MR. POPPE: I have a question. In fiRuiing 
out the pension, it's based on points that you 
accumulate lor the 25 year |>*» iod. 
"THE COURT: That's right. 
"MR. POPPE: And so would this stnrt when 
the marriage started and stop when the mar-
riage separated? 
THE COURT: It starts— 
"MR. POPPE: Anything before that, would 
that count? 
"THE COURT: Were you in the sarvice be-
fore you married? 
"MR. POPPE: Yes, sir. 
"THE COURT: And you have credit f«i that? 
"MR. POPPE: Yes, .sir. 
"THE COURT: Then that's all yours. Thaijij 
the reason you have to figure it out, That's 
another item counsel is going to have to figure 
out. When you prepare the decree, you figure 
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gcther with the format and language of the 
interlocutory judgment that what the court 
did and intended to do was to adjudicate 
that the community properly interest \n the 
retirement benefits was that accruing be-
tween February 23, 194G and June 16,1973, 
that former wife was entitled to one-half of 
such community property interest if and 
when former husband should become eligi-
ble for and apply for the pension and that 
jurisdiction was reserved to permil the 
court to make an order for an "appropriate 
amount*' out of the pension to be paid to 
former wife if and when pension payments 
should materialize. Our conclusion in this 
regard is confirmed by the fact that, so far 
as appears, no evidence was introduced at 
the dissolution trial as to how Naval Re-
serve retirement benefits were calculated 
and no mention of the point system was 
made at the hearing other than former 
husband's query to the court near the con-
clusion of the hearing (see fn. 2, ante). 
Further, hud the court intended finally to 
divide the retirement benefits at the time 
of the dissolution its use of the language 
that former wife "has a right to apply for 
and obtain" her portion of the benefits 
would be rendered most inappropriate, 
ThusT wife's application for a "modifica-
tion" of the judgment of dissolution was in 
reality a request to the court to exercise its 
reserved jurisdiction to make an order spec-
ifying the proportion and amount of her 
interest in the Naval Reserve pension. The 
court having reserved jurisdiction by its 
order that former wife would have in the 
future the "right to apply for and obtain" 
her share of the pension, the court was not 
precluded from entertaining former wife's 
application and making an order quantify-
ing her interest. 
[2] Next former husband contends that 
the trial court's apportionment of the pen-
sion was legally erroneous. Alternatively 
he argues that the federal statute basing 
Naval Unserve pensions on a point system is 
it uut. What you accumulated by points to-
ward your peusiun prior to the lime of mar-
riage is a hundred percent your separate prop-
erty, it's only from the dale of marriage that 
the wife has one-half interest in that. And then 
preemptive of any stale law that would 
apportion il upon dissolution of marriage on 
another basis or that apportionment on the 
basis of the "time rule" was arbitrary and 
unreasonable and constituted an abuse of 
judicial discretion. Former husband cites 
no relevant authority in support of hb (fed- M 
eral preemption argument, and wo reject it. 
(Cf. Gorman v. Gorman, 90 CaLApp.3d 454T 
460 462, 153 Cal.Rptr. 479.) However, wo 
agree that the apportionment made by the 
trial court was erroneous because the basis 
upon which the apportionment was made, 
years of service during the marriage before 
separation compared to "qualifying" years 
in service, bears no substantial rational re-
lationship to the amount of the pension. 
[3] Former wife assert* that the "time 
rule" is the normal basis for apportioning 
retirement benefits earned in part during 
coveture and was appropriately employed 
by the court in the case at bench. Al-
though the "time rule*' is not the only ac-
ceptable method for apportioning retire-
ment benefits between the community and 
separate estates (see In re Marriage of Ad-
ains> 64 Cal.App.3d 181,186, fn. 6,187, fn. 8, 
134 Cal.Rptr. 298), it is apparently the 
method most frequently employed. (See, e. 
g., in re Marriage of Judd, 68 Cal.App.Sd 
515, 522, 137 Cal.Rptr. 318; In re Marriage 
of Adams, supra, 6M CaLApp.Sd at pp. 181, 
184, 134 Cal.Rptr, 298, et seq; In re Mar-
riage of Anderson, 64 Cal.App.3d 36, 39-40, 
134 Cal.Rptr, 252; In re Marriage of Frei-
berg, 57 CaUpp.Sd 304, 310, 127 Cal.Rptr. 
792.) 
However, apportionment on the basis of 
the "time rule" is appropriate only where 
the amount of the retirement benefits is 
substantially related to the number of years 
of service. The rule and it* rationale were 
aptly stated in fn ro Marriage of Judd, 
supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 622-523, 137 
Cal.Rptr. 318, 321. "The most effective 
method of accomplishing the above result 
would be to determine the community in-
from the time of separation, not divorce but 
separation, then that ends. All right. Is there 
any item now of property that the Court has 
not disposed of?" 
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tcrcst to ho that fraction of retirement as-
sets, the numerator of which represents the 
length of service during the marriage but 
before the separation, and the denominator 
of which represents the total length of ser-
vice by the cmployuc-spousc. Such disposi-
tion would comport with what we have 
termed the 'time rule.' [Citation.l fl] . . 
The reason why California courts have ac-
cepted this manner of division as properly 
implement!vc of the 'equal division' require-
ment of Civil Code section 4800 is apparent: 
Where the total number of years served by 
fin cmployec-spou&c is a substantial factor 
m computing- the amount of retirement 
benefits to be received by fhat spouse, the 
community is entitled to have its share 
based upon the length of service performed 
on behalf of the community in proportion to 
the total length of service necessary to earn 
those benefits. The relation between yearn 
of community service to total years of ser-
vice provides a fair gauge of that portion of 
retirement benefits attributable to commu-
nity effort" (Emphasis added.) Thus it is 
that in each and all of the cited cases the 
amount to be received in retirement bene-
I»r fits depended upon or was substantially] re-
lated to the number of years of service 
rendered. (See In re Marriage of Judd, 
supra, 68 CaI.App.3d at pp. 5)9, 522-523, 
137 Cal.Rptr. 318, 321; In re Adams, supra, 
64 Cal.App.3d at p 186, 134 Cal.Rptr. 298; 
In re Marriage of Anderson, supra, 64 Cal. 
App.3d at p. 39, 134 Cal.Rptr. 262; In re 
Marriage of Freiberg, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 308, 127 Cal.Rptr. 792.) 
In the case at bench the amount of for-
mer husband's pension is not substantially 
related to the number of years he served in 
the Naval Reserve. The only relationship 
between the number of years of service and 
the pension is that to be eligible for the 
pension former husband must have served a 
minimum number of "qualifying" years, 
years in which be earned SO or more points. 
That condition having been satisfied, all 
points earned, whether in a "qualifying" 
year or not, counted in fixing the amount of 
his pension. The number of points that can 
be earned in a year may be as high as 364 
or as low as 1, depending on the nature and 
frequency of the service rendered, not the 
number of years served. Thus the amount 
of the pension is not a function of the 
number of years of service; the number of 
years of service during the marriage is not 
a fair gauge of the community contribution; 
and the court's apportionment of the pen-
sion on the basis of the number of "qualify-
ing" years served as compared to the num-
ber of years of service during the marriage 
must be said to be unreasonable, arbitrary 
and an abuse of discretion. 
The argument that without the reserve 
service during the marriage no pension at 
all would be received in correct, but it is of 
no significant help in resolving the problem. 
There would likewise hc» no pension but for 
former husband's service before the mar-
riage and after the separation of the par-
ties. To the extent service during the mar-
riage contributed to former husband's rank 
and thus increased his base pay, former 
wife has no cause for complaint. The pen-
sion is based on the increased base pay, and 
she thus receives the benefit of the in-
creased base pay. Indeed, she receives the 
benefit also of any increase in base pay 
resulting from former husband's reserve 
service after separation of the parties. 
Spousal Supjtnrt 
The spousal support order made at the 
time of the dissolution required former hus-
band to pay to former wife $200 per month 
for one year, thereafter $150 per month for 
one year and thereafter $100 a month until 
further order of the court. At that time 
former wife was unemployed, and the court 
indicated to her that one reason it was 
making the Btepclown order was to give her 
incentive to find employment. 
I Subsequently she did find employment J±« 
and on May 7, 1974, former husband filed 
an order to show cause re modification, in 
which he sought the termination of support. 
After hearing the court ordered the amount 
of the monthly payment reduced from $150 
to $100 one year in advance of the time 
tabic set forth in the original order. 
The instant proceedings were commenced 
by former husband's filing another order to 
show cause re modification for the termina-
tion of spousal support. This time his re-
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quest for termination was based on the fact band, especially 
that the daughter of the parties born De-
cember 1), 1957, had married and moved 
from the residence which she had shared 
with former wife up to that time. 
Former husband points out that at the 
hearing former wife admitted in her testi-
mony that her expenses would be somewhat 
reduced because of the daughter's marriage 
and departure from the residence they 
shared. Former husband concludes that a 
change of circumstances was shown, and 
the trial court Abused its discretion in de-
dining to reduce the amount of or termi-
nate spousal support. Not so. 
[4] In the first place, former husband's 
premise that a change of circumstances was 
shown does not support his conclusion that 
a modification or termination of spousal 
support, WHS thereby required. A modifica-
tion of spousal support cannot be granted in 
the absence of proof of a change in circum-
stances. However, the converse is not true; 
a showing of changed circumstances docs 
not necessarily mandate a modification of 
spousal support. 
In any event, there is no showing whatev-
er that the trial court abused its discretion 
in requiring former husband to continue to 
pay spousal support in the amount of $100 
per month. Former wife is employed, but 
her gross earnings approximate $692 per 
month. In addition her financial declara-
tion disclosed income of $100 per month in 
public assistance and $95.33 per month paid 
to her by former husband on account of her 
interest in the Naval Reserve pension. She 
thus had gross income of $887.33 per month 
and a monthly net of $714.53. Her listed 
monthly expenses, which appear to be quite 
modest, amounted to $8)6 pQ.r month, $102 
per month in excess of her net earnings. 
By contrast, husband's net monthly income 
was declared by him to l>c $1,572 per month, 
and his monthly expenses wore listed as 
$1,355 per month. Thus, by his own figures 
former husband's net income exceeded his 
expenses by more than $200 jwr month. 
The duration of the marriage was in excess 
Ji* ofj27 years, and former wife is entitled to 
maintain a standard of living not substan-
tially different from that of former hux-
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when former husband's 
own figures indicate that he is well able to 
pay the required support. 
The court acted with propriety in de-
clining to modify the amount of spousal 
support. 
[6] Having concluded that the appor-
tionment of the Naval Reserve pension 
made by the trial court is erroneous, the 
question remains what disposition to make. 
The requirement is that the apportionment 
of retirement benefits between the separate 
and community property estates must be 
reasonable and fairly representative of the 
relative contributions of the community and 
separate estates. (Sec In re Marriage of 
Judd, supra, 68 CaLApp.Sd at pp. 52£-523, 
137 CaLRptr. 318; In re Marriage of Ad-
urns, suprn, 64 Cai.App.3d at p, 187, 134 
Cal.Rptr, 298; cf. in re Marriage of Frei-
berg, suprn, 57 Cal.App.3d at p. 312, 127 
Cal.Rptr. 792.) The basis for apportion-
ment, however, is a matter committed to 
the judicial discretion of the trial court. 
(See In IV Marriage of Judd, supra, 68 
. Cal.App.3d At p. 522, 137 Cal.Rptr. 318; In 
re Marriage of Adams, supra; cf. In re 
Marriage of Freiberg, supra.) The discre-
tion to be exercised is that of the trial 
court, not a reviewing court. (See In re 
Marriage of Judd, supra.) Although it is 
fairly obvious that apportionment on the 
basis of points as urged by former husband 
would be Appropriate, we would usurp the 
function of the trial court by modifying the 
judgment to apportion the retirement bene-
fits on that basis. 
Accordingly, the order is reversed insofar 
as it establishes former wife's interest in 
the Naval Reserve pension, with directions 
to the trial court to redetermine the respec-
tive interests in the pension in a manner 
and o)i a basis consistent with this opinion. 
In all other respects the order appealed 
from is affirmed. In the interests of justice 
former wife shall recover costs on appeal, 
but the parties shall bear their own respec-
tive attorney fees on appeal. 
TAMURA, Acting P. J., and McDANIEL, 
J., concur. 
